We obtain a recursive formulation for a general class of contracting problems involving incentive constraints. These constraints make the corresponding maximization (sup) problems non-recursive. Our approach consists of studying a recursive Lagrangian. Under standard general conditions, there is a recursive saddle-point (infsup) functional equation (analogous to a Bellman equation) that characterizes the recursive solution to the planner's problem and forward-looking constraints. Our approach has been applied to a large class of dynamic contractual problems, such as contracts with limited enforcement, optimal policy design with implementability constraints, and dynamic political economy models.
Introduction
Recursive methods have become a basic tool for the study of dynamic economic models. For example, Stokey et al. (1989) and Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004) describe a large number of macroeconomic models that can be analysed using recursive methods. A main advantage of this approach is that it characterizes optimal decisions -at any time t -as time-invariant functions of a small set of * This is a substantially revised version of previously circulated papers with the same title (e.g. Marcet and Marimon 1998 & 1999) . We would like to thank Fernando Alvarez, Truman Bewley, Edward Green, Robert Lucas, Andreu Mas-Colell, Fabrizio Perri, Edward Prescott, Victor Rios-Rull, Thomas Sargent, Robert Townsend and Jan Werner for comments on earlier developments of this work, all the graduate students who have struggled through a theory in progress and, in particular, Matthias Mesner and Nicola Pavoni for pointing out a problem overlooked in previous versions. Support from MCyT-MEyC of Spain, CIRIT, Generalitat de Catalunya and the hospitality of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis are acknowledged. state variables. In engineering systems, knowledge of the available technology and of the current state is enough to decide the optimal control, since current returns and the feasible set depend only on past and current predetermined variables. In this case the value of future states is assessed by the value function and, under standard dynamic programming assumptions, the Bellman equation is satisfied and a standard recursive formulation is obtained.
However, one key assumption to obtain the Bellman equation is that future choices do not constrain the set of today's feasible choices. Unfortunately, this assumption does not hold in many interesting economic problems. For example, in contracting problems where agents are subject to intertemporal participation, or other intertemporal incentive constraints, the future development of the contract determines the feasible action today. Similarly, in models of optimal policy design agents' reactions to government policies are taken as constraints and, therefore, future actions limit the set of current feasible actions available to the government. Many dynamic games -for example, dynamic political-economy models -share the same feature that an agent's current feasible actions depend on functions of future actions.
In general, in the presence of forward-looking constraints -as in rational expectations models where agents commit to contracts subject to incentive constraints (e.g. commitment may be limited) -optimal plans, or contracts, do not satisfy the Bellman equation and the solution is not recursive in the standard sense. In this paper we provide an integrated approach for a recursive formulation of a large class of dynamic models with forward-looking constraints by reformulating them as equivalent recursive saddle-point problems.
Our approach has a wide range of applications. In fact, it has already proved to be useful in the study of very many models 1 . Just to mention a few examples: growth and business cycles with possible default (Marcet and Marimon (1992) , Kehoe and Perri (2002) , Cooley, et al. (2004) ); social insurance (Attanasio and Rios-Rull (2000) ); optimal fiscal and monetary policy design with incomplete markets (Aiyagari, Marcet, Sargent and Seppälä (2002) , Svensson and Williams (2008) ), and political-economy models (Acemoglu, Golosov and Tsyvinskii (2011) ). For brevity, however, we do not present further applications here and limit the presentation of the theory to the case of full information.
We build on traditional tools of economic analysis such as duality theory of optimization, fixed point theory, and dynamic programming. We proceed in three steps. We first study the planner's problem with incentive constraints (PP) as an infinite-dimensional maximization problem, and we embed this problem in a more general class of planner's problems (PP µ ); these problems are parameterized by the weight (µ) of a (Benthamite) social welfare function, which accounts for the functions appearing in the constraints with future controls (forward-looking constraints). The objective function of PP µ is similar to Pareto-optimal problems where µ is the vector of weights given to the different infinitely-lived agents in the economy.
Second, we consider the Lagrangean which incorporates the forward-looking constraints of the first period, which defines our starting saddle-point planner's problem (SPP µ ) and we prove a duality result between this saddle-point problem and the planner's problem (PP µ ). This construction helps to characterize the 'non-recursivity problem'and provides a key step towards its resolution.
As is well known, the solution of dynamic models with forward-looking constraints is, in general, time-inconsistent, in the following sense: if at some period t > 0 the agent solves PP µ for the whole future path given the state variables found at t, the agent will not choose the path that he had chosen in period zero (unless, of course, the forward-looking constraints are not binding, up to period t). This 'non-recursivity problem'is at the root of the difficulties in expressing the optimal solution with a time-invariant policy function.
A key insight of our approach is to show that there is a modified problem PP µ such that if the agent reoptimizes this problem at t = 1 for a certain µ , the solution from period t = 1 onwards is the same that had been prescribed by PP µ from the standpoint of period zero. The key is to choose the vector of weights µ appropriately. We show that the appropriate µ is given by the Lagrange multipliers of SPP µ in period zero. This procedure of sequentially connecting saddle-point problems is well defined and it is recursive when solutions are unique. The problem PP µ can be thought of as the 'continuation problem'that needs to be solved each period in order to implement the constrained-efficient solution. This supports our claim that the recursive formulation is obtained by introducing the vector µ, summarizing the evolution of the Lagrange multipliers, as co-state variable in a time-invariant policy function. As a result, with our method it is easy to guarantee existence of the solution to PP µ for any µ ≥ 0, making the practical implementation of this method no more complicated than standard dynamic programming problems.
Third, we extend dynamic programming theory to show that the sequence of modified saddle-point problems (SPP µ t ) satisfies a saddle-point functional equation (SPFE; a saddle-point Bellman equation) and, conversely, that policies obtained from solving the saddle-point functional equation (SPFE) provide a solution to the original SPP µ and, therefore, to the PP µ problem. This latter sufficiency result is very general; in particular, it does not rely on convexity assumptions. This is important because incentive constraints do not have a convex structure in many applications. However, this result is limited in that we assume (local) uniqueness of solutions. We discuss the role this assumption plays and, in particular, we show how our approach, and results, do not depend on this assumption.
In addition, we also show how standard dynamic programming results, based on a contraction mapping theorem, generalize to our saddle-point functional equation (SPFE) . An immediate consequence of these results is that one can use standard computational techniques that have been used to solve dynamic programming problems -such as the solution of first-order-conditions for a given recursive structure of the policy function, or value function iteration -to solve dynamic saddle-point problems. Not only the computational techniques needed but also our assumptions are standard in dynamic economic models.
Our approach is related to other existing approaches that study dynamic models with expectations constraints, in particular to the pioneering works of Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti (1990) , Green (1987) and Thomas and Worrall (1988) , and the applications that have followed. We briefly discuss how these, and other, works relate to ours in Section 6, after presenting the main body of the theory in Sections 4 and 5. Section 2 provides a basic introduction to our approach and Section 3 a couple of canonical examples (most proofs are contained in the Appendix).
Formulating contracts as recursive saddle-point problems
In this section we give an outline of our approach, leaving the technical details and proofs to sections 4 and 5. Our interest is in solving problems that have the following representation:
x 0 = x, s 0 = s, and a t is measurable with respect to (. . . , s t−1 , s t ), where r, , p, h 0 , h 1 are known functions, β, x, s known constants, {s t } ∞ t=0 an exogenous stochastic Markov process, N j = ∞ for j = 0, ..., k, and N j = 0 for j = k + 1, ..., l.
Standard dynamic programming methods only consider constraints of form (2) (see, for example, Stokey, et al. (1989) and Cooley, (1995) ). Constraints of form (3) are not a special case of (2), since they involve expected values of future variables 2 . We know from Kydland and Prescott (1977) that, under these constraints, the usual Bellman equation is not satisfied, the solution is not, in general, of the form a t = f (x t , s t ) for all t, and the whole history of past shocks s t can matter for today's optimal decision. By letting N j = ∞ PP covers a large class of problems where discounted present values enter the implementability constraint. For example, long term contracts with intertemporal participation constraints take this form.
3 Alternatively, by letting N j = 0 2 One might think that expressing (3) in the form v(xt, st) − ψ(xt, st) ≥ 0, where v is the discounted sum Et P ∞ n=0 β n h 0 (x t+n , a t+n , s t+n ), xt, at, st) and ψ = h 1 − h 0 converts (3) into (2). But this does not solve the problem since v is not known a priori.
3 Combining (2) and (3) accounts for a broad class of constraints. For example, a nonlinear participation constraint of the form g(Et P ∞ n=0 β n h(x t+n , a t+n , s t+n ), xt, at, st) ≥ 0 can PP covers problems where intertemporal reactions of agents must be taken into account. For example, dynamic Ramsey problems, where the government chooses policy variables subject to optimal dynamic behavior by the agents in the economy, have this form 4 . Even though we focus on the two canonical cases N j = ∞ and N j = 0, intermediate cases can be easily incorporated. It is then without loss of generality that we let N j = ∞, for j = 0, ..., k, and N j = 0 for j = k + 1, ..., l.
A first step of our approach is to consider a more general class of problems, parameterized by µ:
and a t is measurable with respect to (. . . , s t−1 , s t ).
The main difference with PP is that in PP µ we have incorporated the h j 0 functions of the forward-looking constraints (3) into the objective function. Also, the superindex j now starts from j = 0, with h 0 0 ,, to account for the reward function of the original problem. More precisely, if we let h 0 0 = r, we set µ = (1, 0, ..., 0) and we choose a very large h 0 1 to guarantee that (5) is never binding for j = 0, PP µ is the original PP. Furthermore, it should also be noticed that the value function of this problem, when well defined -say, V µ (x, s) -is homogeneous of degree one in µ; a property that our approach exploits (and the reason for collecting the original return function r of PP in the objective function, together with the forward-looking elements of the constraints).
Notice that PP µ is an infinite-dimensional maximization problem which, under relatively standard assumptions, is guaranteed to have a solution for arbitrary µ ≥ 0. The solution is a plan 5 a ≡ {a t } t=0 , where a t (. . . , s t−1 , s t ) is a state-contingent action (Proposition 1).
An intermediate step in our approach is to transform program PP µ into a saddle-point problem in the following way. Consider writing the Lagrangean for PP µ when a Lagrange multiplier γ ∈ R l+1 is attached to the forward-looking constraints only in period t = 0 and the remaining constraints for t > 0 are left easily be incorporated in our framework with one constraint of form (2), g(wt, xt, at, st) ≥ 0 (with control variables (wt, at)), and one of form (3), Et P ∞ n=0 β n h(x t+n , a t+n , s t+n ) = wt. 4 See Section 6 for references to related work using constraints of the form N j = ∞ and N j = 0.
5 We use bold notation to denote sequences of measurable functions.
If we find a saddle-point of L subject to (4) for all t ≥ 0 and (5) for all t ≥ 1, the usual equivalences between this saddle-point and the optimal allocation of PP µ can be exploited. Using simple algebra it is easy to show that L can be rewritten as the objective function in the following saddle point problem 6 :
s.t.
for initial conditions x 0 = 0 and s 0 = s, where ϕ is defined as
The usefulness of SPP µ comes from the fact that its objective function has a very special form: the term inside the expectation in (7) is precisely the objective function of PP ϕ(µ, γ * ) given the states (x * 1 , s 1 ). This will allow us to show that if ({a *
That is, the continuation problem that needs to be solved in the next period is precisely a planner problem where the weights have been shifted according to ϕ.
We show that, under fairly general conditions, solutions to PP µ are solutions to SPP µ (Theorem 1), and viceversa (Theorem 2). Also, the usual slackness conditions will guarantee that if ({a * t }, γ * ) solves SPP µ , then
so that the values achieved by the objective functions of SPP µ and PP µ coincide. 6 We use the notation µh 0 (x, a, s)
If PP µ were a standard dynamic programming problem (i.e. without (5)), then the following Bellman equation would be satisfied:
s.t. p(x, a, s) ≥ 0.
The reason that the Bellman equation holds is that in standard dynamic programming if PP µ is reoptimized at period t = 1 given initial conditions (x * 1 , s 1 ), the reoptimization simply confirms the choice that had been previously made for t ≥ 1. However, with forward-looking constraints (5) this Bellman equation is not satisfied, the reason being that if the problem is reoptimized at t = 1 the choice will violate the forward-looking constraint of period t = 0, if (5) is binding at t = 0. A central element of our approach is that, as suggested by the objective function of SPP µ , if the solution is reoptimized in period t = 1 with the new weights µ = ϕ(µ, γ * ) -that is, if in period one the reoptimization is for the problem PP µ , -the result confirms the solution of the original problem PP µ . This allows the construction of a recursive formulation of our original PP µ problem where the value function with modified weights is included in the right-hand side of a functional 'Bellman-like'equation to capture the terms in (7). More specifically, we show that under fairly general assumptions solutions to SPP µ obey a saddle-point functional equation (SPFE). More specifically, we look for functions W that satisfy the following:
and we show that this holds for W (x, µ, s) = V µ (x, s) (Theorem 3).
We only consider problems where the infsup problem has unique optimal choices.
7 In this case optimal allocations and multipliers are uniquely determined and there is a policy function ψ, i.e. ( a * , γ * ) = ψ(x, µ, s), associated with a value function W satisfying SPFE. Finally we show that the following recursive formulation
gives the optimal policy we are seeking. More precisely, we first show that, given {a * t , γ * t } generated by ψ for initial conditions (x, µ, s),
The Principle of Optimality with forward-looking constraints
We now briefly discuss in which sense our central result is not a simple restatement of the standard dynamic programming principle of optimality to our saddle-point formulation 8 . This principle says (when there are no forwardlooking constraints)
9 : if V µ satisfies the Bellman equation (9), evaluated at (x, s)), it is the (sup) value of PP µ , when the initial state is (x, s), and a sequence {a * t } ∞ t=1 solves PP µ if and only if it satisfies:
In our context, under standard assumptions it is true that if {a * t } ∞ t=1 solves PP µ when the initial state is (x, s) and attains the value
is the sequence of Lagrange multipliers associated with the sequence of SPP µ (Theorems 1 and 3) .
However, the converse, sufficiency, theorem that if W (x, µ, s) satisfies SPFE and ({a *
solves PP µ is only true if, in addition, W (x, µ, s) = µω(x, µ, s) and (11) if j = 0, ..., k, and ω j (x These recursive equations for the forward-looking constraints are needed to guarantee that these constraints are also satisfied in the original PP µ . Notice that if W (x, µ, s) is differentiable in µ then, by Euler's Theorem, W (x, µ, s) = µω(x, µ, s) (where ω j ≡ ∂ µ j W ) and equations (11) and (12) follow from the Envelope Theorem. We show, and use, the fact that if {a * t } ∞ t=1 is unique (at least locally unique) then W (x, µ, s) is differentiable in µ and, therefore, we recover the Principle of Optimality for our saddle-point formulation (Theo-rems 4 and 5), without having to impose equations (11) and (12) as 'promisekeeping'constraints 10 . Before we turn to these results in Sections 4 and 5, in the next Section we show how our approach is implemented in a couple of canonical examples.
Two Examples
In this Section we illustrate our approach with two examples. In the first, there are only intertemporal participation constraints, so it is a case when N j = ∞ (i.e. k = l); in the second, there are only intertemporal one-period (Euler) constraints and hence it is a case with N j = 0 (i.e. k = 0). The first is similar to the model studied in Marcet and Marimon (1992) , Kocherlakota (1996) , Kehoe and Perri (2002) , among others, and it is canonical of models with intertemporal default constraints; the second is based on the model studied by Aiyagari et al. (2002) and it is a canonical model with Euler constraints, as in Ramsey equilibria of optimal fiscal and monetary policy.
Intertemporal participation constraints.
We consider as an example a model of a partnership, where several agents can share their individual risks and jointly invest in a project which can not be undertaken by single (or subgroups of) agents. Formally, there is a single good and J infinitely-lived consumers. The preferences of agent j are represented by E 0 ∞ t=0 β t u(c j t ); u is assumed to be bounded, strictly concave and monotone, with u(0) = 0; c represents individual consumption. Agent j receives an endowment of consumption good y j t at time t and, given a realization of the vector y t , agent j has an outside option that delivers total utility v a j (y t ) if he leaves the contract in period t, where v a j is some known function. It is often assumed that the outside option is the autarkic solution:
, which implicitly assumes that if agent j defaults in period t he is permanently excluded from the partnership and he has no furhter claims on its production or capital in, or after, period t.
Total production is given by F (k, θ), and it can be split into consumption c and investment i. The stock of capital k depreciates at the rate δ. The joint process {θ t , y t } ∞ t=0 is assumed to be Markovian and the initial conditions (k 0 , θ 0 , y 0 ) are given. The planner looks for pareto-optimal allocations that ensure that no agent ever leaves the contract. Letting Y t = J j=1 y j t > 0, the planner's problem 10 In our previous work (Marcet and Marimon (1998, 1999) ) we assumed uniqueness of solutions and used the fact that the contraction mapping theorem guarantees the uniqueness of the value function. Messner and Pavoni (2004) showed how the principle of optimality could fail in our context when solutions are not unique, the missing element being the recursivity of the forward-looking constraints. The above statement of the principle of optimality for problems with forward-llooking constraints and, correspondingly, our sufficiency theorems address this issue, which we further discuss in Section 6. takes the form:
It is easy to map this planner's problem into our PP formulation. Let
Problems PP µ and SPP µ are obtained mechanically by insuring that (5) is not binding for j = 0.
Finally we obtain the recursive formulation that we are seeking. SPFE takes the form
We know that W (k, µ, y, θ) = V µ (k, y, θ) solves this functional equation. Letting ψ be the policy function associated with it, solutions to PP satisfy
The planner would obtain the full commitment solution (subject to intertemporal participation constraints) from period t onwards if in period t = 1 he solved PP µ * 1 given initial conditions (k * 1 , θ 1 , y 1 ), provided that the weights α of the agents were adjusted according to µ * 1 . Co-state variables µ * t become the additional weight that the planner should assign to each agent above the initial weight α j if the planner reoptimizes in period one. The variable µ t is all that needs to be remembered from the past.
This recursive formulation allows easy computation of solutions using either first-order conditions or value function iteration. It also helps in characterizing the solution to the optimal problem: the weights µ * t evolve according to whether or not their participation constraints are binding. Every time that the participation constraint for an agent is binding, his weight is increased permanently by the amount of the corresponding Lagrange multiplier. An agent is induced not to default by increasing his consumption permanently, not only in the period where he is tempted to default, but smoothly over time.
Due to these changing weights, relative marginal utilities across agents are not constant when participation constraints are binding, since the first-orderconditions imply
, for all i, j and t.
It follows that individual paths of consumption depend on individual histories (in particular, on past 'temptations to default') and not just on the initial wealth distribution and the aggregate consumption path, as in the Arrow-Debreu competitive allocations. This dependence on the past is completely summarized by µ t (and, by homogeneity, the weights α j + µ j t+1 can be normalized to add up to one). This also shows that if enforcement constraints are never binding (e.g. punishments are severe enough) then µ t = µ 0 and we recover the "constancy of the marginal utility of expenditure", and the "constant proportionality between individual consumptions," given by u (c
In other words, the evolution of the co-state variables can also be interpreted as the evolution of the distribution of wealth. If intertemporal participation constraints are binding infinitely often there may be a non-degenerate distribution of consumption in the long-run; in contrast with an economy where intertemporal participation constraints cease to be binding, as in an economy with full enforcement.
12
The evolution of the weights µ also helps to characterize the decision for capital: the intertemporal Euler equation of SPP µ is given by:
, a distortion which does not vanish unless the non-negative process γ i t converges to zero.
Intertemporal one-period constraints: a Ramsey problem
We present an abridged version of the optimal taxation problem studied by Aiyagari at al. (2002) . A representative consumer solves max {ct,et,bt+1}
where c is consumption and e is effort (e.g. hours worked). The government must finance exogenous random expenditures g by issuing debt and collecting taxes. Feasible allocations satisfy c t + g t = e t . The budget of the government mirrors the budget of the representative agent. For convenience we assume the government can not get too much in debt due to a constraint b t+1 ≥ B. In a competitive equilibrium, the following intertemporal and intratemporal equations must be satisfied (provided b t+1 > B):
In a Ramsey equilibrium the government chooses sequences of taxes and debt that maximize the utility of the consumer subject to the allocations being a competitive equilibrium allocations. Substituting the above equilibrium equations into the budget constraint of the consumer, the Ramsey equilibrium can be found by solving
where e t = c t + g t is left implicit. This problem can be represented as a special case of PP by letting
Problems PP µ and SPP µ are then easily defined.
Finally, we obtain the recursive formulation that we are seeking. In its original notation, SPFE takes the form
13 Here we incorporate the knowledge that γ 0 * = 0.
Letting ψ be the policy function associated with this functional equation, efficient allocations satisfy
It is clear that in this case the only element of µ that matters is the Lagrange multiplier γ t−1 . The planner would obtain the full commitment solution from period t onwards if in period t = 1 he solved PP µ * 1 given initial conditions (b * 1 , g 1 ),; that is, if the objective function were modified to include the term γ 1 0 b 1 u (c 1 ) in addition to the consumer's discounted utility from t = 1 onwards. This term captures the commitment to enforcing the Euler equation (13) 
This recursive formulation allows easy computation of solutions using either first-order-conditions or value function iteration. It also helps charactere the solution to the optimal problem. The first-order conditions of the Ramsey problem imply that solutions satisfy
As discussed in Aiyagari et al. (2002) , with incomplete markets, this implies that γ * 1,t is a non-negative submartingale. Lagrange multipliers modify the weight given to debt relative to the complete markets case. The optimal policy can now be understood as forcing the planner in each period to modify the deadweight loss of taxation with weight γ * t−1 .
4 The relationship between PP µ , SPP µ , and SPFE This section proves the relationships between the initial maximization problem PP µ , the saddle-point problem SPP µ and the saddle-point functional equation SPFE discussed in the previous Sections. We first describe the basic structure of the problems being considered.
Basic Structure
There exists an exogenous stochastic process {s t } ∞ t=0 , s t ∈ S, defined on the probability space (S ∞ , S, P ). As usual, s t denotes a history (s 0 , ..., s t ) ∈ S t and S t the σ-algebra of events of s t ; while {s t } ∞ t=0 ∈ S ∞ , with S the corresponding σ-algebra. An action in period t, history s t , is denoted by a t (s t ), where a t (s t ) ∈ A ⊂ R m ; when there is no confusion, it is simply denoted by a t . Given s t and the endogenous state x t ∈ X ⊂ R n , an action a t is feasible if p(x t , a t , s t ) ≥ 0. If the latter feasibility condition is satisfied, the endogenous state evolves according to x t+1 = (x t , a t , s t+1 ). Plans, a = {a t } ∞ t=0 , are elements of A = {a : ∀t ≥ 0, a t :
denotes the space of m-valued, essentially bounded, S t -measurable functions. The corresponding endogenous state variables are elements of X = {x :
Given initial conditions (x, s), a plan a ∈ A and the corresponding x ∈ X , the evaluation of the plan in PP µ is given by
We can describe the forward-looking constraints by defining g :
Given initial conditions (x, s), the corresponding feasible set of plans is then
Then PP µ can be written in compact form as
We denote solutions to this problem as a * and the corresponding sequence of state variables x * . When the solution exists we define the value function of
Similarly, we can also write SPP µ in a compact form, by defining
Note that B only differs from B in that the forward-looking constraints in period zero g(a) 0 ≥ 0 are not included as a condition in the set B , but instead these constraints form part of the objective function of SPP µ .
Assumptions and existence of solutions to PP µ
We consider the following set of assumptions:
is a Markovian stochastic process defined on the probability space (S ∞ , S, P ).
A2. (a) X ⊂ R
n and A is a closed subset of R m . (b) The functions p : X × A × S → R and : X × A × S → X are measurable and continuous.
A3. Given (x, s), there exist constants B > 0 and ϕ ∈ (0, β −1 ), such that if p(x, a, s) ≥ 0 and x = (x, a, s ), then a ≤ B x and x ≤ ϕ x .
A4. The functions h j i (·, ·, s), i = 0, 1, j = 0, ..., l, are continuous and uniformly bounded, and β ∈ (0, 1).
A5. The function (·, ·, s) is linear and the function p(·, ·, s) is concave. X and A are convex sets.
A6. The functions h
A6s. In addition to A6, the functions h j 0 (x, ·, s), j = 0, ..., l, are strictly concave.
A7. For all (x, s), there exists a program { a n } ∞ n=0 , with initial conditions (x, s), which satisfies the inequality constraints (4) and (5) with strict inequality.
Assumptions A1 and A2 are part of our basic structure, described in the previous sub-section. These assumptions, together with A3-A4, are standard and we treat them as our basic assumptions. Assumptions A5-A7 are often made but they are not satisfied in some interesting models; however, these assumptions are only used in some of the results below. For example, the concavity assumptions A5-A6 are not needed for many results, and assumption A7 is a standard interiority assumption, only needed to guarantee the existence of Lagrange multipliers.
The following proposition gives sufficient conditions for a maximum to exist for any µ. The aim is not to have the most general existence theorem 14 , but to stress that one can find fairly general conditions under which PP µ has a solution for any µ, which will be crucial in the discussion of how our approach compares with that of Abreu, Pearce and Stachetti, since this ensures that the continuation problem (namely PP ϕ(µ,γ) ) is well defined for any γ. Proposition 1. Assume A1-A6 and that the set of possible exogenous states S is countable. Fix (x, µ, s) ∈ X × R l+1 + × S. Assume there exists a feasible plan a ∈ B(x, s) such that f (µ,x,s) ( a) > −∞. Then there exists a program a * which solves PP µ with initial conditions x 0 = x, s 0 = s.
Furthermore, if A6s is also satisfied then the solution is (almost surely) unique.
Proof: See Appendix.
The relationship between PP µ and SPP µ
The following result says that a solution to the maximum problem is also a solution to the saddle point problem. It follows from the standard theory of constrained optimization in linear vector spaces (see, for example, Luenberger (1969, Section 8.3 , Theorem 1 and Corollary 1). As in the standard theory, convexity and concavity assumptions (A5 to A6), as well as an interiority assumption (A7) are necessary to obtain the result.
Theorem 1 (PP µ =⇒ SPP µ ). Assume A1-A7 and fix µ ∈ R l+1 + . Let a * be a solution to PP µ with initial conditions (x, s). There exists a γ * ∈ R l + such that (a * , γ * ) is a solution to SPP µ with initial conditions (x, s).
Furthermore, the value of SPP µ is the same as the value of PP µ . more precisely:
Proof: This is an immediate application of Theorem 1 (8.3) in Luenberger (1969) , p. 217.
The following is a theorem on the sufficiency of a saddle point for a maximum.
Furthermore, the value of the two programs is the same and (16) holds.
Notice that Theorem 2 is a sufficiency theorem 'almost free of assumptions.' All that is needed is the basic structure of section 4.1 defining the corresponding infinite-dimensional optimization and saddle-point problems together with the assumption that a solution to SPP µ exists. Once these conditions are satisfied assumptions A2 to A7 are not needed.
Proof:
The following proof is an adaptation, to SPP µ , of a sufficiency theorem for Lagrangian saddle points (see, for example, Luenberger (1969) , Theorem 8.4.2, p.221).
If (a * , γ * ) solves SPP µ , minimality of γ * implies that, for every γ ≥ 0,
* is a feasible program for PP µ . Furthermore, the minimality of γ * implies that
which contradicts the maximality of a * for SPP µ .
Finally, using γ * g(a
The relationship between SPP µ and SPFE
Recall that a function W :
In (17) we substituted inf sup with min max, implicitly assuming that a solution to the saddle point problem exists, in which case the value W (x, µ, s) is uniquely determined 15 . In other words, the right-hand side of SPFE is well defined for all (x, µ, s) and W for which a saddle point exists.
We say that W satisfies SPFE if it satisfies SPFE in any possible state (x, µ, s) ∈ X × R l+1 + × S. Given W, we define the saddle-point policy correspondence (SP policy correspondence) Ψ :
for µ * = ϕ(µ, γ * ) and (18);
for x * = (x, a * , s) and (19)} .
If Ψ W is single valued, we denote it by ψ W , and we call it a saddle-point policy function (SP policy function). We define the function W * (x, µ, s) ≡ V µ (x, s). The following theorem says that W * satisfies SPFE.
Theorem 3 (SPP µ =⇒ SPFE). Assume that SPP µ has a solution for any
As in Theorem 2, Theorem 3 is also a theorem 'almost free of assumptions,' once the underlying structure and the existence of a well-defined solution to SPP µ at all possible (x, µ, s) is assumed.
Proof: By theorem 2, we have that whenever SPP µ has a solution W * is well defined. Then, we first prove that, for any given (x, µ, s), if (a * , γ * ) solves SPP µ at (x, s) the following recursive equation is satisfied:
15 See Lemma 3A in Appendix B.
To prove ≤ in (20) we write
where σa * is the original optimal sequence shifted one period; formally, letting the shift operator σ : S t+1 → S t be given by σ(s t ) = (s 1 , s 2 ..., s t ), we define the S t+1 -measurable function σa * t as σa * t (s) ≡ a * t+1 (s). The first equality follows from the definition of W * , and because Theorem 2 guarantees (16) the second equality follows from the definition of f, g and simple algebra. The third equality follows from the definitions of f , ϕ, and a * . The weak inequality follows from the fact that a * is a feasible solution to the problem PP ϕ(µ, γ * ) with initial conditions (x * 1 , s 1 ) and that this program achieves V ϕ(µ, γ * ) (x * 1 , s 1 ) at its maximum. The last equality follows from Theorem 2 and (16).
To show ≥ in (20) we construct a sequence a + that consists of the optimal choice for SPP µ for initial conditions (x, s) in the initial period, but subsequently is followed by the optimal choices for PP ϕ(µ, γ * (x,µ,s)) for initial conditions (x * 1 , s 1 ). To define a + formally, we explicitly denote by (a * (x, µ, s), γ * (x, µ, s)) a solution to SPP µ for given initial conditions (x, s) and we let
for all (x, µ, s) and t ≥ 1. Also, we let x + be the corresponding sequence of state variables.
In what follows, we again simplify notation and go back to denoting a * t (x, µ, s) by a * t , γ * (x, µ, s) by γ * , and a
where the first equality has been argued before, the first inequality follows from the fact that a + (x, µ, s) is a feasible allocation in SPP µ for initial conditions (x, s) but that a * (x, µ, s) is a solution to the max part to SPP µ at (x, s). The second equality just applies the definition of f and g, and the last equality follows because a + is optimal for PP ϕ(µ, γ * (x,µ),s) given initial conditions (x * 1 , s 1 ) from period 1 onwards and because Theorem 2 ensures that (16) holds.
Notice that for this step of the proof it is crucial that we use SPP µ in order to obtain a recursive formulation. The first inequality above only works because we are considering a saddle point problem. Indeed, the a + sequence (which reoptimizes in period t = 1) is feasible for SPP µ because this problem does not impose the forward looking constraints in t = 0. The sequence a + would not be feasible in the original problem PP µ , because by reoptimizing at period t = 1 the forward-looking constraints at t = 0 would be typically violated.
This ends the proof of (20).
To show that W * satisfies SPFE we now prove that the right-hand side of SPFE is well defined at W * and that (a * 0 , γ * ) is a saddle point of the right-hand side of (17) 
We first prove that a * 0 solves the max part of the right-hand side of SPFE. Given any a ∈ A, p(x, a, s) ≥ 0, letting a * t (s t ) ≡ a * t−1 ( (x, a, s ), ϕ(µ, γ * ), s )(σ(s t )) for t ≥ 1, the definition of a * t , and (16) give the following first equality:
The second equality follows by definition, and the inequality holds because (a * , γ * ) solves the max part of SPP µ , while the third equality follows from (16). Now we can combine this with (20) to obtain that for all feasible a ∈ A µh 0 (x, a, s) + γ * h 1 (x, a, s) + βE [W * (x A similar argument shows that γ * solves the min part. For any γ ∈ R l+1 + now let
where the inequality follows from the facts that shifting the policies one period back, the plan a * is a feasible plan for the PP ϕ(µ, e γ) problem with initial conditions (x * 1 , s ) and that W * (x * 1 , ϕ(µ, γ), s ) is the optimal value of PP ϕ(µ, e γ) . The second inequality follows because (a * , γ * ) is a saddle point of SPP µ and the equalities follow from definitions, Theorem 2 and (20).
Therefore, γ * solves the min part of the right side of SPFE.
Therefore (a * 0 , γ * ) is a saddle point of the right-hand side of SPFE. This implies the first equality in
and the second equality comes, again, from (20). This proves that W * satisfies SPFE.
The argument used in the proof of Theorem 3 can be iterated a finite number of times to show the underlying recursive structure of the PP µ formulation. If PP µ has a unique solution {a * t } ∞ t=0 at (x, s), then by Theorem 1 there is a SPP µ at (x, s) with solution ({a * t } ∞ t=0 , γ * ), which in turn defines a PP ϕ(µ, γ * ) problem. As has been seen in the proof of Theorem 3, {a * t } ∞ t=1 solves PP ϕ(µ, γ * ) at ( (x, a * 0 , s), s 1 ) and by Theorem 1 there is a γ *
Then by recursively applying the argument of the proof of Theorem 3 we obtain the following result. at (x, s), then, for any (t, x * t , s t ), a * t+j
is the solution to PP ϕ (t) (µ, γ * ) at (x * t , s t ), where γ * is the minimizer of SPP µ at (x, s).
The value function has some interesting properties that we would like to emphasize. First, notice that
at (x, s) is uniquely defined, then W * has a unique representation
where, for
This representation not only has an interesting economic meaning -for example, as a 'social welfare function,' with varying weights, in problems with intertemporal participation constraints -but is also very convenient analytically. In particular, this reprensentation shows 16 that W * is convex and homogenous of degree one in µ, with W * (x, 0, s) = 0, for all (x, s) 17 . In addition, the following Corollary to Theorem 3 also shows that W * satisfies what we call the saddle-point inequality property SPI. Lemmas 1 and 2 below show how these properties are extended to general W functions satisfying SPFE.
A function W (x, µ, s) = l j=0 µ j ω j (x, µ, s) satisfies the saddle-point inequality property SPI at (x, µ, s) if and only if there exist (a * , γ * ) satisfying
for any γ ∈ R l+1 + and ( a, x ) satisfying the technological constraints at (x, s); that is, in SPI the multiplier minimization is taken in relation to the optimal continuation values.
Proof: We only need to show that (21) is satisfied, but this is immediate from the following identities:
and the definition of SPP µ at (x, s); that is, for any γ ∈ R l+1
We now show that, under fairly general conditions, programs satisfying SPFE are solutions to SPP µ at (x, s). More formally, Theorem 4 (SPFE =⇒ SPP µ ) Assume W , satisfying SPFE, is continuous in (x, µ) and convex and homogeneous of degree one in µ. If the SP policy correspondence Ψ W associated with W generates a solution (a * , γ * ) (x,µ,s) , where (a * ) (x,µ,s) is uniquely determined, then (a * , γ * ) (x,µ,s) is also a solution to SPP µ at (x, s).
Notice that the assumptions on W are very general. In particular, if W (x, µ, s) is the value function of SPP µ at (x, s) (i.e. W (x, µ, s) ≡ V µ (x, s)) then (as Lemma 2A in Appendix B shows) it is convex and homogeneous of degree one in µ and, if A2 -A5 are satisfied it is continuous and bounded in (x, µ). The only 'stringent condition' is that (a * ) (x,µ,s) must be uniquely determined, which is the case when W is concave in x and A6s is satisfied ( see Corollary 4.1.).
Before proving these results, we show that, as we have seen for W * , convex and homogeneous functions W satisfying SPFE have some interesting properties, which are used in the proof of Theorem 4. First, without loss of generality (see F2 and F3 in Appendix C), we can express the recursive equation (17) in the form
where µω d (x, µ, s) = W (x, µ, s), and the vectors ω d and ω d are (partial) directional derivatives in µ of W (x, µ, s) and W (x * , ϕ(µ, γ * ), s ), respectively. Therefore, the SPFE saddle-point inequalities take the form
for any γ ∈ R l+1 + and ( a, x ) satisfying the technological constraints at (x, s). Second, as we show in Lemma 1, there is an equivalence between this SPFE property and the saddle-point inequality property, SPI, which substitutes (24) with
Third, as we show in Lemma 2, if in addition (a * , γ * ) (x,µ,s) is uniquely determined, then W is differentiable in µ. Alternatively, if W is not differentiable in µ , then different choices of ω d can result in different solutions and the union of all these different solutions are the solutions to the saddle point problem, given by (26) and (25).
Lemma 1 (SPI ⇐⇒ SPFE). If W (x, ·, s) is convex and homogeneous of degree one, then (24) is satisfied if and only if (26) is satisfied. Furthermore, the inequality (26) is satisfied if and only if the following conditions are satisfied, for j = 0, ..., l,:
To see that SPFE =⇒ SPI, let
and
. By homogeneity of degree zero of ω d (x * , µ , s ) with respect to µ ,
Given the differentiability of ∇G (x, a * , s) (y k , µ) at γ k , the continuity 18 of ϕ and
and, therefore,
, which, in turn, implies the equivalence between (24) and (26).
Finally, the proof of the Kuhn-Tucker conditions is standard. First, the necessity of (27) follows from the fact that γ * ≥ 0 is finite, which will not be the case if, for some j = 0, ..., l,
To see the necessity of (28), let γ * j (i) = γ * j , if j = i, and γ * i (i) = 0. Then (26) results in:
which, together with (27), implies that
To see that (27) and (28) imply (26), suppose they are satisfied and there exists a γ ≥ 0 for which (26) is not, then it must be that Proof of Lemma 2: By (28) the recursive equation (23) simplifies to
Assume, for the moment, that (a * , γ * ) (x,µ,s) is uniquely determined. By recursive iteration, it follows that
Therefore, the uniqueness of (a
is also generated by Ψ W (x, µ, s). Both saddle-point paths must have the same value (see Lemma 3A in Appendix B). In particular, following the same recursive argument,
which proves the differentiablity of W with respect to µ, even when (γ * ) (x,µ,s) is not uniquely determined (i.e. there may be kinks in the Pareto frontier)
An immediate, and important, consequence of Lemma 2 is the following result:
Corollary: If (a * ) (x,µ,s) is uniquely defined by Ψ W (x, µ, s), from any initial condition (x, µ, s), then the following (recursive) equations are satisfied:
Furthermore, (a * ) (x,µ,s) is uniquely defined by Ψ W (x, µ, s) whenever W (·, µ, s) is concave and A6s is satisfied.
Notice that, in proving Lemma 2, the uniqueness of the solution paths has implied the uniqueness of the value function decomposition: W = µω. This unique decomposition has implied the recursive equations (29) and (30). Uniqueness of the value function decomposition is equivalent to the differentiability of the value function. In fact, once it has been established that the value function is differentiable, one can obtain equations (29) and (29) as a simple application of the Envelope Theorem. For example, equation (29) is just 20 :
We now turn to the proof of Theorem 4, where the recursive equations (29) and (30) play a key role.
Proof (Theorem 4): By Lemma 2, there is a unique representation W (x, µ, s) = µω(x, µ, s). To see that solutions of SPFE satisfy the participation constraints of SPP µ , we use the first-order-conditions (27) and (28), as well 20 We use the standard notation
, and also ω j (x, µ, s) ≡ ∂ j W (x, µ, s).
as the recursive equations of the forward-looking constraints (29) and (30) of the previous Corollary. As in the proof of Lemma 2, equation (29) can be iterated to obtain
Following the same steps for any t > 0 and state (x * t , µ * t , s t ), equation (30) and (31) together with the inequality (27) show that the intertemporal participation constraints in PP µ -and therefore in SPP µ -are satisfied; that is,
(32) Now, to see that solutions of SPFE are, in fact, solutions of SPP µ we argue by contradiction. Suppose there exist a program { a t } ∞ t=0 , and { x t } ∞ t=0 , x 0 = x, x t+1 = ( x t , a t , s t+1 ) satisfying the constraints of SPP µ with initial condition (x, s) and such that
The following string of equalities and inequalities, which we explain at the end, contradict this inequality:
+ βµ
Notice that the first equality (34) is just uses the value function decomposition, the other two equalities (36) and (40) are simple expansions of the saddle-point value paths (i.e., of (23)) and in these expansions equations (29) and (30) play a key role. Inequalities (35) and (37) follow from the maximality property of SPFE. Inequalities (38) and (39) require explanation. Inequality (38) follows from one of the properties of convex and homogeneous of degree one functions (i.e. F4: µω( µ) ≥ µω(µ), see Appendix), given that (38) is simply µ
Inequality (39) follows from applying the slackness inequality (27), as well as equations (30) and (31) to the plan generated by SPFE in state ( x 2 , µ * 1 , s 2 ) (i.e. to {a * t ( x 2 , µ * 1 , s 2 )} ∞ t=2 ); these inequalities are needed to show that this plan satisfies the corresponding SPP constraints (32); that is, h j 1 ( x 1 , a 1 , s 1 ) + βω j ( x 2 , µ * 1 , s 2 ) ≥ 0, j = 0, ..., l. Finally, since the equality (40) is simply the equality (36) after one iteration, repeated iterations result in the last inequality (41), which contradicts (33).
It only remains to be shown that the inf part of SPP is also satisfied. Reasoning again by contradiction, suppose there exist a γ ≥ 0 such that
Using the value function decomposition representation, this inequality can also be expressed as
but the first-order-conditions (27) and (28) require that (26) is satisfied, i.e.
which contradicts (42) The Corollary to Lemma 2 implies the following Corollary to Theorem 4:
Corollary 4.1. Assume W , satisfying SPFE, is continuous in (x, µ), convex and homogeneous of degree one in µ, concave in x and that A6s is satisfied.
is also a solution to SPP µ at (x, s).
DSPP and the contraction mapping theorem
In this Section we show how our main results -Theorems 3 and 4 -can also be obtained by applying the Contraction Mapping Theorem to the Dynamic Saddle-Point Problem, corresponding to SPFE. This Section provides more general sufficient conditions for obtaining a solution to the original problem PP µ starting from SPFE. While these conditions are satisfied whenever the conditions of Theorem 4 are satisfied, they help to better understand the passage SPFE→PP µ and, in particular, they show how the standard method of value function iteration extends to our saddle-point problems and, therefore, that computing solutions to our original PP µ does not require special computational techniques. Furthermore, it also shows the interest of using the W = µω representation in computing recursive contracts (i.e. taking ω as the starting vector valued function) and how, in contrast with the 'promise keeping' approach to solving contractual problems, 'promised values' are not part of the constraints, but an outcome of the recursive contract 21 . We first define some spaces of "value" functions: , s) is continuous, and W (·, µ, s) bounded, when µ ≤ 1, ii)W (x, ·, s) is convex and homogeneous of degree one} and
M b is a space of continuous, bounded functions (in x), and convex and homogenous of degree one (in µ)
22 , while M bc is the subspace of concave functions (in x). Both spaces are normed vector spaces with the norm
We show in Appendix D (Lemma 6A) that they are complete metric spaces; therefore, suitable spaces for the Contraction Mapping Theorem.
Since, whenever W satisfies (ii ) it can be represented as W (x, µ, s) = µω(x, ·, s) (see Lemma 4A), it is convenient to define the corresponding spaces of the functions:
is continuous, and ω j (·, µ, s) bounded, when µ ≤ 1 ii)ω j (x, ·, s) is convex and homogeneous of degree zero} and
Notice that ω ∈ M uniquely defines a function W ∈ M, given by W ≡ µω, but W ∈ M does not uniquely define a R l+1 valued function ω ∈ M ; it does, however, when, in addition, W is differentiable in µ (see Appendix C) 23 . 21 We further discuss the 'promise keeping' approach in Section 6. 22 Without loss of generality, we could also require that W (x, 0, s) < ∞ and then replace (ii) with W (x, ·, s) is sublinear (see footnote 12).
23 M denotes either M b or M bc .
As we have seen in Section 4 24 , when W * (x, µ, s) = V µ (x, s) is the value of SPP µ , with initial conditions (x, s), then W * (x, µ, s) = l j=0 µ j ω * j (x, µ, s) with W * ∈ M b , whenever A2 -A4 are satisfied (and W * ∈ M bc if in addition A5 -A6 are satisfied); furthermore, ω * ∈ M is unique whenever (a * ) (x,µ,s) is uniquely defined.
Given a function ω ∈ M , and an initial condition (x, µ, s), we can define the following Dynamic Saddle Point Problem:
DSPP
To guarantee that this problem has well-defined solutions we make an interiority assumption:
A7b. For any (x, s) ∈ X × S, there exists an a ∈ A, satisfying p(x, a, s) > 0, such that, for any µ ∈ R l+1 + , µ < +∞, and j = 0, ..., l, h
Notice that A7b is satisfied, whenever A7 is satisfied and µ ω( (x, a, s ), µ , s ) is the value function of SPP ( (x, e a, s ),µ ,s ) . In general, A7b is not a restrictive assumption in the class of possible value functions if the original problem has interior solutions. Nevertheless, an assumption, such as A7b is needed when one takes DSPP (x,µ,s) as the starting problem. This is a relatively standard min max problem, except for the dependency of ω on ϕ(µ, γ). The following proposition shows that it has a solution. Obviously, solutions to DSPP (x,µ,s) satisfy SPFE. . An immediate consequence of A7b, is the following lemma:
Lemma 3. Assume A4 and A7b and let ω ∈ M b . There exists a B > 0 such that if (a , s) ) the solution to DSPP at (x, µ, s), and let a be the interior solution of A7b. Then
By assumption,
is uniformly bounded ( A4 and ω ∈ M b imply that there is uniform bound for the max value), while if (γ
Therefore, there must be a B > 0 such that γ * ≤ B µ Proposition 2. Let ω ∈ M bc and assume A1-A6 and A7b. There exists (a * , γ * ) that solves DSPP (x,µ,s) . Furthermore if A6s is assumed, then a * (x, µ, s) is uniquely determined.
Proof: This is a relatively standard proof of existence of an equilibrium, based on a fixed point argument; see Appendix D.
The following Corollary to Theorem 3, is a simple restatement of the theorem in terms of the Dynamic Saddle Point Problem:
When DSPP (x,µ,s) has a solution, it defines a SPFE operator T
When W ≡ µω, with ω ∈ M , and DSPP (x,µ,s) uniquely defines the values h
if j = 0, ..., k, and
Two remarks are in order. First, as already said, notice that (T ω j ) corresponds to the 'promise keeping' approach to solving contractual problems but in our approach (T ω j ) is not a constraint: it is an outcome. Second, a fixed point of T * does not imply a fixed point of T when 'the planner' is indifferent to T reallocations (e.g. Then T * : M → M is a well-defined contraction mapping. Let W * = T * (W * ) and W * = µω * . If in addition the solutions a * (x, µ, s) to DSPP are unique, then ω * = T (ω * ) is unique.
Proof: The first part follows from showing that Blackwell's sufficiency conditions for a contraction are satisfied for T * (see Lemmas 7A to 10A in Appendix D); the second part from the definition of T .
Our last Theorem, Theorem 5, wraps up our sufficiency results and is, in fact, a Corollary to Theorem 4. It shows how, starting from a Dynamic SaddlePoint Problem and a corresponding well defined Contraction Mapping resulting in a unique value function, one obtains the solution to our original problem PP µ . The previous Propositions 2 and 3 provide conditions guaranteeing that the assumptions of Theorem 5, regarding T , are satisfied.
is the value of SPP µ at (x, s) and the solutions of DSPP define a saddle-point correspondenceΨ, such that if (a * , γ * ) is generated by Ψ from (x, µ, s), then (a * , γ * ) solves SPP µ at (x, s) and a * is the unique solution to PP µ at (x, s).
Proof: By assumption SPFE is satisfied. The proof of Theorem 4 is based on having a unique representation W * (µ, x, s) = µω * (x, µ, s) which, in that proof, is given by Lemma 2. In Theorem 5 such a unique representation is assumed, which implicitly also means assuming that the values h j 0 (x, a * (x, µ, s), s) j = 0, ..., l are uniquely determined, which in fact is all that is needed in the proof of Theorem 4.
Related work
Precedents of our approach can be found in Epple, Hansen and Roberds (1985) , Sargent (1987) and Levine and Currie (1987) , who introduced Lagrange multipliers as co-state variables in linear-quadratic Ramsey problems. Similarly, recent studies of optimal monetary policy in sticky price models have included Lagrange multipliers as co-states. Often, the reason given for including these past multipliers as co-states is the observation that past multipliers appear in the first-order-conditions of the Ramsey problem. Our work provides a formal proof that, with standard assumptions, co-state past multipliers deliver the optimal solution in a general framework, encompassing a larger class of models with forward-looking constraints.
The pioneer work of Abreu, et al. (1990) -APS, from now on, -characterizing sub-game perfect equilibria, shows that past histories can be summarized in terms of promised utilities. Earlier related work was by Green (1987) and Thomas and Worral (1988) . This approach has been widely used in macroeconomics 26 . Some applications are by Kocherlakota (1995) in a model with participation constraints, and Cronshaw and Luenberger (1994) in a dynamic game. Also, as in the earlier work, Kydland and Prescott (1980) , Chang (1998) and Phelan and Stacchetti (1999) study Ramsey equilibria using promised marginal utility as a state variable, and they note the analogy of their approach with APS's.
Both APS and our approach have in common that starting from non-recursive problems allow optimal solutions to be obtained (obviously, the same solutions) where forward-looking constraints have a recursive structure. In relatively simple problems (e.g., convex problems of full information and low dimensionality, in terms of state variables and number of forward-looking constraints) the two approaches can be seen as mirrors of each other. Nevertheless, there is a conceptual difference which sets these two approaches further apart as more complex problems are analyzed: our state (including the co-state µ) is predetermined, while promised-utilities -as co-state variables -are not; furthermore, in the APS approach in taking future promised-utilities as choice variables, the recursive structure of forward-looking constraints must be taken as 'promise keeping' constraints, while in our approach we obtain this recursive structure as a result (see, Subsection 2.1) 27 .
As is well known, promised utilities in the APS approach have to be restricted to lie in a set where the continuation problem is well defined; otherwise algorithmic computations break down. The set of feasible promised utilities is not known beforehand. It can only be characterized numerically, often leading to very complicated calculations. Whenever there are several natural state variables the set of feasible promised utilities is a function of the natural state variables and the problem of finding the set of feasible utilities is daunting. Considerable progress has been made either by improving algorithms or by redefining the problem at hand 28 , but the issue of constraining promised utilities (or marginal utilities in a Ramsey problem) is always present.
One key advantage of our approach is that the continuation problem is given by PP µ , and it is easy to find standard assumptions guaranteeing that this problem has a solution for any co-state µ ≥ 0; in fact, the set of feasible costates is known beforehand: it is simply the positive orthant. The difficulties associated with computing a set of co-states for which the continuation problem is well defined are absent.
A second advantage lies in the dimensionality of the decision vector. In the APS approach the planner has to decide at t the utility promised at all possible states in t + 1. If the underlying exogenous state variable can take N s possible values the planner has to decide on at least N s controls at t. Most applications of APS constrain themselves to assuming that the exogenous variable is binomial (say, it can be 'high'or 'low'), but if exogenous variables can take many values a high-dimensional decision vector has to be solved for. Again, there are ways of dealing with this, but it is no doubt an added difficulty. By contrast, in our approach the dimensionality of the decision variable is independent of N s .
An additional issue is that the initial conditions for the state variables in our approach are given from the outset, namely µ 0 = 1 and µ j = 0 for j ≥ 1, while in the promised utility approach the promised-utility in the first period has to be solved for separately. It is well known that to do thisis necessary that the Pareto frontier is downward slopping; otherwise the computations can become very cumbersome.
29
Finally, an interesting -but not exclusive -feature of our approach is that the evolution of µ often helps to directly characterize the behavior of the model. For example, in models with participation constraints the µ's allow to interpret the behavior of the model as changing the Pareto weights sequentially depending on how binding the participation constraints become. In Ramsey type models the behavior of the µ's is associated with the commitment technology and the role that budget constraints play in the objective function of the planner. We have discussed these interpretations in Section 3. Also, our approach facili- Marcet (2008) for more details.
28 See, for example, Abraham and Pavoni (2005) or Judd, Yeltekin and Conklin (2003) . 29 Even with two agents and a downward slopping Pareto frontier, as in Kocherlakota (1996) , one may be interested in finding the efficient allocation that ex-ante gives the same utility to both agents. While this is trivial with our approach (just give the same initial weights in the PP problem), it becomes very tricky with the APS approach since the 'right promise' must be made to determine the initial conditions.
tates the identification of cases where despite the presence of forward-looking constraints the co-state variables do not need to be introduced in the model.
30
The APS approach does, however, have some strengths over our approach. For example, it allows for the characterization of all feasible paths (not only the constrained-efficient) and it naturally applies to models with private information or models with multiple solutions. However, these initial advantages are also being overcome. Sleet and Yeltekin (2010) and Mele (2010) have extended our approach to address moral hazard problems. In problems with multiple (locally unique) solutions, it is also possible to find other feasible paths using our approach by changing the objective function. However, as the example of Messner and Pavoni (2004) shows, there are problems where optimal paths are bound to have a continuum of solutions (i.e. when the constrained-efficient Pareto frontier has flats). We have maintained the assumption of (local) uniqueness in this paper; nevertheless, Marimon, Messner and Pavoni (2011) have recently shown that there is a natural extension of our approach to solve problems with non-uniqueness 31 . Many applications of our approach can be found in the literature, although it is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss them in detail. This seems to be testimony to the convenience of using our approach, especially in the presence of intertemporal participation constraints with natural state variables such as capital (as in Subsection 3.1) or first-order Euler equation constraints with bonds as natural state (as in Subsection 3.2).
Perhaps most interesting is that the approach here can be used as an intermediate step in solving models that go beyond the pure formulation of PP. For example, a second generation of models considers endogenous participation constraints, as in the non-market exclusion models of Cooley et al. (2004) , Quadrini (2011), and Ferrero and Marcet (2005) . In these models the functions h that appear in the incentive constraints are endogenous; they depend on the optimal or equilibrium solution, and the approach of this paper is often used as an intermediate step, defining the underlying contracts. This allows the study of problems where the outside option is determined in equilibrum as in models of debt renegotiation and long-term contracts. Furthermore, the work of Debortoli and Nunes (2010) extends our approach to study models of partial commitment and political economy, and the work of Marimon and Rendhal (2011) extends it to study models where agents can behave strategically with respect to their participation constraints, as in dynamic bargaining problems with endogenous separations.
30 This can be the case, for example, in Cooley, Quadrini and Marimon (2004) and Anagnostopoulos, Cárceles-Poveda and Marcet (2011) .
31 Marimon, Messner and Pavoni (2011) show how the results presented here can be applied when the co-state is extended with the 'last non-negative multiplier'. Cole and Kubler (2010) also provide a solution for the non-uniqueness case. Their approach involves a mix of our approach and of the APS approach; they provide a solution for the two-agent case with intertemporal participation constraints.
Concluding remarks
We have shown that a large class of problems with implementability constraints can be analysed using an equivalent recursive saddle-point problem. This saddlepoint problem obeys a saddle point functional equation, which is a version of the Bellman equation. This approach works for a very large class of models with incentive constraints: intertemporal enforcement constraint, intertemporal Euler equations in optimal policy and regulation design, etc. This means that a unified framework can be provided to analyse all these models. The key feature of our approach is that instead of having to write optimal contracts as history-dependent contracts one can write them as a stationary function of the standard state variables together with additional co-state variables. These co-state variables are -recursively -obtained from the Lagrange multipliers associated with the intertemporal incentive constraints, starting from pre-specified initial conditions. This simple representation also provides economic insight into the analysis of various contractual problems; for example, with intertemporal participation constraints it shows how the (Bethamite) social planner changes the weights assigned to different agents in order to keep them within the social contract; in Ramsey optimal problems it shows the cost of commitment to the benevolent government.
We have provided here the first complete account of the basic theory of recursive contracts. Nevertheless, we had already expounded most of the elements of the theory in our previous work (in particular, Marcet and Marimon (1988 & 1999) ), which has allowed others to built on it. Many applications are already found in the literature, showing the convenience of our approach, especially when natural state variables are present. Useful extensions are already available encompassing a larger set of problems than the ones considered here. Lemma 1A. Assume A1-A6 and that S is countable, then i) B(x, s) is non-empty, convex, bounded and σ(L ∞ , L 1 ) closed; therefore it is σ(L ∞ , L 1 ) compact;
ii) Given d ∈ R, the set a ∈ A : f (x,µ,s) (a) ≥ d is convex and σ(L ∞ , L 1 ) closed.
The proof of Lemma 1A builds on three theorems. First, the Urysohn metrization theorem stating that regular topological spaces with a countable base are metrizable 32 . Second, the Mackey-Arens theorem stating that different topologies consistent with the same duality share the same closed convex sets; in our case, the duality is (L ∞ , L 1 ) and the weakest and the strongest topology consistent with such duality; namely, the weak-star, σ(L ∞ , L 1 ) and the Mackey τ (L ∞ , L 1 ) . Third, the Alaoglu theorem stating that norm bounded σ(L ∞ , L 1 ) closed subsets of L ∞ are σ(L ∞ , L 1 ) compact 33 .
Proof:
Assumptions A2, and A4 -A6 imply that B(x, s) is convex, and closed under pointwise convergence. Since, by assumption S is countable, Urysohn metrization theorem guarantees that B(x, s) is, in fact, σ(L ∞ , L 1 ) closed. Assumptions A3 and A4 imply that B(x, s) is bounded in the · It follows that if a * ∈ P d * then f (x,µ.s) (a * ) ≥ f (x,µ.s) (a) for any a ∈ B(x, s). Furthermore, if strictly concavity is assumed then P d * must be a singleton; otherwise convex combinations of elements of P d * will form a proper closed subset of P d * contradicting its minimality Appendix B (Some Properties of W * )
Lemma 2A. Let W * (x, µ, s) ≡ V µ (x, s) be the value of SPP µ at (x, s), for an arbitrary (x, µ, s). Then i ) W * (x, ·, s) is convex and homogeneous of degree one;
ii ) if A2-A4 are satisfied W * (·, µ, s) is continuous and uniformly bounded; and iii ) if A5 and A6 are satisfied W * (·, µ, s) is concave.
Proof: i ) follows from the fact that, for any λ > 0, f (x,λµ.s) (a) = λf (x,µ.s) (a). To see this, let (γ * , a * ) satisfy SFPE, i.e.
f (x,µ.s) (a * ) + γg(a * ) 0
Lemma 3A: If the inf sup problem SPFE at (x, µ, s), has a solution then the value of this solution is unique.
Proof: It is a standard argument: consider two solutions to the right-hand side of SPFE at (x, µ, s), ( a, γ) and ( a, γ). Then repeated application of the saddle-point condition implies: Therefore the value of the objective at both ( a, γ) and ( a, γ) coincides
Appendix C (Some Properties of convex homogeneous functions)
To simplify the exposition of these properties let F : R m + → R be continuous, convex and homogeneous of degree one. The subgradient set of F at y, denoted ∂F (y), is given by ∂F (y) = z ∈ R m | F (y ) ≥ F (y) + (y − y)z for all y ∈ R m + .
The following facts, regarding F , are used in proving Lemmas 1 and 2:
F1. If F is convex, then it is differentiable at y if, and only if, ∂F (y) consists of a single vector; i.e. ∂F (y) = {∇F (y)} , where ∇F (y) is called the gradient of F at y.
F2.
If F is convex and finite in a neighborhood of y, then ∂F (y) is the convex hull of the compact set {z ∈ R m | ∃ y k −→ y with F differentiable at y k and ∇F (y k ) −→ z} .
F3. Lemma 4A (Euler's formula). If F is convex and homogeneous of degree one and z ∈ ∂F (y) then F (y) = yz.
F4. Lemma 5A. If F is convex and homogeneous of degree one, for any pair f, f , if f d (y) ∈ ∂F (y) and
F1 is a basic result on the differentiability of convex functions (see, Rockafellar, 1981 , Theorem 4F, or 1970 . F2 is a very convenient characterization of the subgradient set of a convex function (see Rockafellar, 1981 , Theorem 4D, or 1970 . We now provide a proof of the last two facts.
Proof of Lemma 4A: Let z ∈ ∂F (y). Then for any λ > 0, F (λy) − F (y) ≥ (λy − y)z, and, by homogeneity of degree one: (λ − 1)F (y) ≥ (λ − 1)yz. If λ > 1 this weak inequality results in F (y) ≥ yz; while if λ ∈ (0, 1) in F (y) ≤ yz
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Proof of Lemma 5A: To see F4 notice that if f d (y) ∈ ∂F (y) and f d ( y) ∈ ∂F ( y), by convexity, homogeneity of degree one, and Euler's formula: F ( y) = yf d ( y) and
To see that SPFE is satisfied, let γ ≥ 0, µ = ϕ(λµ, γ), a ∈ A(x, s) andBy homogeneity, without loss of generality we can choose an arbitrary µ = 0 such that: µ ≤ (1 + B) −1 . The above inequalities show that T * (W + r) ≤ T * (W ) + βr Lemma 9A (Contraction property): The argument is the standard Blackwell's argument. We show that the contraction property is satisfied. Let W, W ∈ M bc .
Notice that W ≤ W + W − W . Then, using the results of Lemmas 7A and 8A,
Reversing the roles of W and W , we obtain that
Therefore, T * is a contraction mapping
